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DIALECTICAL FEDERALISM:
A TRIBUTE TO THE WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME
COURT OF APPEALS
GENE

R.

NICHOL*

Over the course of the past decade, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals has become something of a controversial institution. Allegedly seeking to ''mold state government in its own image,'' 1 the court has issued decisions restructuring the state property
tax assessment and appraisal scheme, 2 overseeing the funding of public education, 3 . invalidating a gubernatorial veto, 4 expanding tort
claims beyond the umbrella of workers compensation, 5 and ordering
emergency care for the homeless. 6 As a result, the high court has,
perhaps deservedly, "attained a reputation for dramatic intervention
in public policy disputes. " 7
As individual exercises of judicial authority, the court's determinations have received ample attention. Institutional and political
conservatives have claimed that the justices have stepped beyond
their allotted powers, trumped the prerogatives of other organs of
governments, thwarted commercial development, and fostered bad
policies in the process. Liberals and activists, perhaps less frequently,
have complained that the court's efforts have been tempered by the
political winds and thus fall short of the egalitarian goals occasionally suggested in its opinions. 8
* Gene R. Nichol, Cutler Professor of Law and Director, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, College
of William & Mary. Bob Bastress offered a number of helpful suggestions which worked their way
into this comment.
' Charleston Gazette, Jan. I, 1984, at 1B, col. 5.
2 Killen v. Logan County Comm'n, 295 S.E.2d 689 (W. Va. 1982).
' Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979).
• State ex rei. Bd. of Educ. v. Rockefeller, 167 W. Va. 72, 281 S.E.2d 131 (1981).
' Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 161 W. Va. 695, 246 S.E.2d 907 (1978).
6 Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d 245 (\V. Va. 1983).
1
Hagan, Policy Activism in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, 1930-1985, 89 W.
VA. L. REv. 149, 149 (1986).
• Consider, for example, the tone and flourish of the Court's opinions in UMWA v. Parsons,
305 S.E.2d 343 (\V. Va. 1983); Major v. DeFrench, 169 W. Va. 241, 286 S.E.2d 688 (1982); Webb
v. Fury, 167 W. Va. 434, 282 S.E.2d 28 (1981); Pushinsky v. West Virginia Bd. of Law Examiners,
164 W. Va. 736, 266 S.E.2d 444 (1980).
91
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It is not my purpose here to enter that debate. Instead, this brief
comment will consider the work of the court from another direction.
My focus will be the contribution to the development of American
constitutional decisionmaking resulting from the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' efforts to interpret its own constitution.
It is, as Justice Brandeis claimed, "one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous State may . . . serve as
a laboratory" 9 for the formulation of governmental policy. As the
result of an increasing reticence by the United States Supreme Court
and a heightened sensitivity to civil liberties issues by state jurists,
the cast of players molding our constitutional structure has been
substantially expanded. The resulting dialogue, spurred by both state
and federal interpretive ventures, has bolstered the legitimacy and
the precision of constitutional decisionmaking.

The rulings of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals which
construe the provisions of the state constitution, therefore, have special significance not only in the lives of West Virginians but in the
development of a national constitutional jurisprudence. My task is
to examine a handful of cases in which the West Virginia court has
read its own constitution as more demanding than the federal counterpart. Along the way, I think something can be learned about the
constitutional issues which should be particularly appealing to state
tribunals, and about the role that state judiciaries, if inclined, can
play in our constitutional process. Before turning to the West Virginia decisions, however, some perspective is helpful.
I.

THE IMPACT

oF UNITED STATES SUPREME CoURT

DECISIONMAKING

Our constitutional memories are often short. In an era of alleged
overconstitutionalization, it is easy to forget that a mere three decades ago little of our present framework for the protection of constitutional liberties was in place. On the heels of Brown v. Board
of Education, 10 the Warren Court launched a virtual constitutional
• New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)(separate but equal impermissible in public
education).
10
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revolution. In fairly rapid succession, decisions were handed down
not only combatting racial discrimination on a number of fronts 11
but also requiring the reapportionment of legislatures, 12 the incorporation of the bulk of the provisions of the Bill of Rights against
the states, 13 giving more meaningful content to the First Amendment's speech and press guarantees, 14 protecting voting rights, prohibiting orchestrated public school prayer, 15 assuring some measure
of judicial access to the poor, 16 and bolstering the demands of procedural due process. 17 Faced with an avalanche of mandated change,
it is perhaps unsurprising that state supreme courts tended to react
defensively. Many judges, no doubt, disagreed with the Warren Court
agenda. But regardless of the predilections of local jurists, merely
keeping up was a substantial hardship. It was easy, especially in
criminal cases, to embrace the habit of looking no further than the
announced demands of federal constitutional law.
While the Burger Court accomplished no true counter-revolution,18 by the mid-1970s the tenor of United States Supreme Court
decisionmaking had changed. Fewer new categories of constitutional
review were recognized, 19 and existing guarantees were pared back. 20
These substantive retrenchments were accompanied by the adoption
of a variety of jurisdictional principles making access to the federal
courts more difficult. The standing barrier was solidified, relegating
11
See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
715 (1961).
12 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
" See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968) Gury trial); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to
counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (cruel and unusual punishment); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) (search and seizure).
14 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
" Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
16 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (counsel for indigent criminal defendant).
17
See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
18
See V. BLASI, THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (1983).
19 But see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (gender discrimination).
20 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (showing of intent required in racial discrimination cases); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (de facto segregation not unconstitutional);
San Antonio lndep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (fundamental rights analysis curtailed).

u.s.
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agressive suitors to state tribunals. 21 The Younger doctrine was fashioned to assure that pending state cases would actually be tried in
that forum. 22 Finally, habeas corpus review, a mainstay of the Warren Court's supervisory process, was dramatically curtailed. 23 Accordingly, state judiciaries were given a freer hand to conduct criminal
trials. In broad terms, the Burger Court's message was different than
that of its predecessor. While the Warren Court seemed willing to
surmount any potential hurdle to assure constitutional compliance,
the Burger Court often implied that the federal judiciary had strayed
beyond its competence and that states should be left to run their
own houses. 24
A handful of state courts took the implied challenge seriously. 25
The California Supreme Court, for example, confirmed the ''independent nature of the [guarantees of] the California Constitution. " 26 The New Jersey high court similarly concluded that the
provisions of the New Jersey Constitution "should be interpreted
to give ... greater protection" than their federal counterpartsY It
was in this context, aided by a substantial change in membership, 28

21
See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1974) (demanding distinct and palpable injury). See generally Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 68 (1984).
22
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See Nichol, Federalism, State Courts and Section
1983, 73 VA. L. REv. _ _ (forthcoming).
"' See, Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
"" See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976);
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
I should add, however, that the Burger Court occasionally ran against this current.
In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 132 (1983) the Court fashioned a jurisdictional doctrine
which is more interventionist than preceeding principles. Long's adequate and independent
state ground rule demands that local courts indicate "clearly and expressly" that federal
law does not compel the result in order to avoid Supreme Court review. /d. at 1041. Of
course the adequate and independent ground doctrine comes into play primarily when state
courts have chosen to provide more stringent guarantees than the federal constitution demands. Long apparently indicates that "federalism is not a value to be pursued when state
courts have afforded their citizens too much constitutional protection." See Nichol, An Activism of Ambivalence, 98 HARv. L. REv. 315, 321 n.39 (1984). But see, Althouse, How
to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1485
(1987).
25
See generally, Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court,
62 VA. L. REv. 873 (1976).
26
People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 114, 545 P.2d 272, 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 368 (1976).
27
State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353-54, 346 A.2d 66, 67-68 (1975). See also, Brennan, State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977).
28 Hagan, supra note 7 at 151 & 164.
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that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals began to apply
its constitution in earnest.
II.

INTERPRETING THE WEST VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION

Across a broad spectrum of civil and criminal constitutional issues, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has concluded
that the "West Virginia Constitution offers limitations on the power
of the state . . . more stringent than those imposed . . . by the Constitution of the United States. " 29 It is not my intention to catalogue
those limitations, to discover the common themes of the court's
work, or to characterize the overall quality of the judicial product.
It is, instead, to emphasize categories of cases-illustrated by features of key West Virginia decisions - in which independent state
constitutional decisionmaking has proven particularly useful. So
considered, the work of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
represents a notable contribution to the development of constitutional jurisprudence.

A. Filtering Out Federalism
It is perhaps true that it never makes sense for a state supreme

court to reflexively accept United States Supreme Court doctrine as
the outer judicial boundary of the protection of individual rights.
Whether or not so sweeping a statement can be sustained, it is clear
that federal constitutional guidelines should not provide the final
word for state courts when those standards are heavily influenced
by federalism concerns. If the federal judiciary refrains from intervention in particular arenas out of deference to local decisionmakers, state judges should hardly follow in lockstep.
Consider, for example, the landmark ruling in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez. 30 There, Mexican-American
v West Virginia Citizens Action Group, Inc. v. Daley, 324 S.E.2d 713, 725 (W. Va. 1984). See

also, UMWA v. Parsons, 305 S.E.2d 343 (W.Va. 1983); Webb v. Fury, 167 W.Va. 434, 282 S.E.2d
28 (1981); Peters v. Narick, 165 W. Va. 622, 270 S.E.2d 760 (1980); Pushinsky v. West Virginia Bd.
of Law Examiners, 164 W. Va. 736, 266 S.E.2d 444 (1980); Tug Valley Recovery Center, Inc. v.
Mingo County Comm'n, 164 W. Va. 94, 261 S.E.2d 165 (1979); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672,
255 S.E.2d 859 (1979).
30 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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parents of schoolchildren challenged the dramatically disparate perpupil funding resulting from the Texas school finance system. The
United States Supreme Court rejected the claim, ruling that the right
to education is not "fundamental" for purposes of equal protection
scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment. 31 Justice Powell's opinion
for the Court explained that "[i]t is not the province of this Court
to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. " 32 That conclusion was thought
mandated, however, by the need to scrutinize state action under
"judical principles sensitive to the nature of ... the rights reserved
to the states under the [federal] Constitution. " 33
Given those premises, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals correctly refused to follow the federal lead in deciding Pauley
v. Kelly. 34 Lincoln County public school students challenged unequal
expenditures under the State Board of Education funding scheme
in Pauley. While recognizing that Rodriguez foreclosed a traditional
equal protection claim, the West Virginia high court concluded that
it was "not constrained by the federal constitutional standard. " 35
Emphasizing the demand in Article XII, section one of the West
Virginia Constitution for a "thorough and efficient" system of public schools, Pauley declared education to be a fundamental right,
meriting the closest judicial scrutiny. 36 Accordingly, the ''woefully
inadequate'' Lincoln County schools were said to fall short of the
constitutional mark. 37
Rodriguez, of course, is something of a sore thumb in equal
protection jurisprudence. If the primary value served by the equal
protection mandate is equality of opportunity, Rodriguez certainly
presents a strong case for judicial intervention. If one is not born
rich, education is the very foundation of opportunity in the United
States, and money has a substantial effect on the quality of one's

" /d. at 35.
32
/d. at 33.
" /d. at 39.
,. Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979).
" /d. at 679, 255 S.E.2d at 864.
36 /d. at 708, 255 S.E.2d at 878.
37
/d. at 707, 255 S.E.2d at 878.
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education. A public school system, like that involved in Rodriguez,
which results in tremendous disparities of per pupil expenditure,
cannot be readily squared with a serious demand for equality. If
Rodriguez is defensible, then, it is so only on practical grounds.
Given the weighty demands of school desegration, prison reform,
and criminal procedure supervision, the school funding conundrum
was perhaps more than the federal judiciary could reasonably be
asked to bear. But it hardly makes sense for a state court to accept
the harm to equality which Rodriguez, one assumes reluctantly, was
forced to embrace.
The United States Supreme Court's interpretations of the procedural due process mandate have given rise to similar problems.
Decisions since the mid-1970's have frequently employed both
cramped and convoluted definitions of the "liberty" and "property"
interests needed to trigger procedural protection. 38 Paul v. Davis, 39
for example, butchered precedent40 to conclude that no liberty interest was implicated by a governmental scheme which listed the
plaintiff, picture included, as an "active shoplifter" on a flyer distributed to some 800 merchants. 41 Bishop v. Wood, 42 on the other
hand, held that a "permanent employee" who, under local ordinance, could be dismissed only for "adequate grounds,"had no
property interest in the continued enjoyment of his job.43 The driving
force behind both decisions was federalism. Paul characterized the
reputational interest as one "which the State may protect against
injury by virtue of its tort law. " 44 Bishop turned on judicial reluctance to convert federal courts into ''. . . the appropriate forum
in which to review the multitude of personnel decisions made daily"
by such state agencies. 45

" See, Monaghan, Of Liberty and Property, 62 CoRNELL L. REv. 401, 405 (1977).
' 9 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
40 It is impossible to square Paul with Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) and
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
•• Paul, 424 U.S. at 697-700.
42 Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) .
., /d. at 347.
44 Paul, 424 U.S. at 712.
•• Bishop, 426 U.S. at 349.
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Given this manipulation of fourteenth amendment doctrine in
order to afford deference to local officials, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has correctly taken a broader view of constitutional "liberty" and "property." In Major v. DeFrench46 the
justices determined that a public employee discharge, which was factually similar to that involved in Bishop v. Wood, presented appropriately cognizable liberty and property interests. 47 DeFrench held
that even a probationary employee enjoys procedural safeguards under West Virginia law, and that the "pursuit of a lawful occupation"
is a constitutional liberty interest. 48 It remains to be seen whether
these bold procedural pronouncements will stand the test of time. 49
But the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was certainly right
to search for answers beyond the perimeters of a federal standard
which is designed, in no small measure, to limit federal interference
with state prerogative. The tensions which shape federal principles
are not always applicable to the development of state constitutional
law. State supreme courts should work to purge their decisions of
federalism concerns which they do not share.

B.

Deficient Federal Standards
It is readily apparent that, in some particulars, federal consti-

tutional standards lack both consistency and coherence. Of course,
unclear or not, decisions of the United States Supreme Court announce the law of the land; 50 and federal determinations provide a
floor of constitutional protection which state judiciaries must meet. 51
If, however, a state supreme court is willing to read its constitution
as a stronger safeguard of personal liberties than its national counterpart, the adequate and independent state ground doctrine shields
the state ruling from federal review. 52 The autonomous interpretation
... Major v. DeFrench, 169 W. Va. 241, 286 S.E.2d 688 (1982) .
., /d. at 251-57, 286 S.E.2d at 695-98.
" !d. at 254, 286 S.E.2d at 696.
•• See, for example, the curtailed liberty definitions in Orteza v. Monongalia County Gen. Hosp.,
318 S.E.2d 40 (W. Va. 1984) and Freeman v. Poling, 338 S.E.2<i 415 (W. Va. 1985).
so That remains the case, fortunately, whether the Attorney General of the United States agrees
with the rulings or not.
51
See, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
52
See, Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 {1965). See also, H. FINK & M. TUSHNET, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: POLICY & PRACTICE 851-67 {1984).
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of state constitutional provisions provides an opportunity for state
courts to avoid the unsteadying influence of faulty federal constitutional standards. When faced with a troubled federal rule, it makes
sense for state courts to turn to their own charters. Again, the work
of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is instructive.

Peters v. Narick53 is a good example. There the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals invalidated West Virginia's gender-biased
separate maintenance statute which required, in appropriate circumstances, a "husband . . . to provide suitable support for his wife. " 54
The outcome of the case was hardly a surprise. The United States
Supreme Court had struck down a similar provision under the federal constitution only the year before. 55 What was surprising was
the methodology the court chose to employ. Declaring itself ''unimpressed'' with the ''middle tier approach'' commonly employed
in the federal sex discrimination cases, the justices decided the case
under Article III, section 17 of the West Virginia Constitution. 56
Pointing to a "long-standing and comprehensive system" of sex discrimination, the court concluded that gender classifications "are to
be regarded as suspect, [and] accorded the strictest possible judicial
scrutiny." 57
Justice McGraw's opinion in Peters criticized the federal "important governmental objectives," dating from Craig v. Boren, 58 for
being "result oriented. " 59 I'm not sure that is the adjective I would
have chosen - no constitutional standard is more "outcome determinative" than the compelling state interest test which the court
chose to embrace. But if the court's concern was that the important
government interest standard would prove to be too manipulable to
foster predictable decision-making, Peters was clearly prescient.

Peters v. Narick, 165 W. Va. 622, 270 S.E.2d 760 (1980).
,. W. VA. CooE § 48-2-28 (1976).
" See, Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
06 Peters, 165 W. Va. at 630, 270 S.E.2d at 764. Article III, section 17 reads, in pertinent part,
"every person shall have remedy by due course of law."
" /d. at 634, 270 S.E.2d at 766.
•• Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)(gender classifications must be based on "important government interests and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.")
•• Peters, 165 W. Va. at 630, 270 S.E.2d at 764.
'3
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The most glaring problem with the important government interest-middle tier-standard is its studied ambiguity on the meansend scrutiny it demands. Under its terms, gender-biased statutes must
be "substantially related" to the achievement of important government ends. Since the court has not defined "substantial," however,
the standard has been subjected to intense interpretive maneuvering.
In Michael M. v. Superior Court, for example, the United States
Supreme Court accepted a tenuous relationship to a contrived governmental interest to justify the constitutionality of California's gender-biased statutory rape law. 60 And in the male-only draft registration
case, Rostker v. Goldberg, 61 the Court read the gender standard so
deferentially that no elevated review was thought necessary. The
result of all this is that no one has a clue what the federal gender
standard actually is. While Justices Brennan and O'Connor apply
the test stringently, in the hands of Chief Justice Rehnquist it is
hard to imagine a statute that would fall short of the standard's
demands. 62 Fortunately for lawyers and government officials charged
with measuring the requisites of equality, West Virginia avoided this
wrong turn with the opinion in Peters.

Tug Valley Recovery Center, Inc. v. Mingo County Commission, 63 though not a civil liberties case, provides a second example.
There a group of taxpayers challenged the taxing and assessment of
various third-party properties. When faced with a claim that the
plaintiffs lacked standing, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, based on Article III, section 14 of the state constitution, ruled
that "every taxpayer, every person affected by the tax base, has a
financial interest in seeing that all property in the district [is] prop-

"' Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). The California statute was apparently
designed to foster female chastity and to carry out a presumption that minor females-unlike their
male counterparts-cannot consent to sexual intercourse. Moreover, even if one accepts California's
latter day statement of legislative purpose-prevention of teenage pregnancy-the statute was not a
reasonable method (compared with a gender neutral statute) to carry out that interest.
•• Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
62
See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. For Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (O'Conner, J.);
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981)(Rehnquist, J.); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976)(Brennan, J .).
63
Tug Valley Recovery Center, Inc. v. Mingo County Comm'n, 164 W. Va. 94, 261 S.E.2d
165 (1979).
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erly taxed. " 64 As a result, the West Virginia Constitution has been
read to provide an extremely liberal, and extremely clear, rule on
taxpayer standing. Unfortunately, the same can hardly be said of
the United States Supreme Court.
Federal taxpayer standing guidelines date from the 1968 decision
in Flast v. Cohen. 65 There, in a remarkably unpersuasive opinion,
the Court concluded that federal taxpayers have a sufficient "personal stake'' to challenge expenditures 66 if the statute attacked is an
exercise of the spending power, and if the government action allegedly violated a specific constitutional limitation. 67 Of course, for
decades it has been difficult to understand why a taxpayer's "personal stake'' varies so dramatically depending on the nature of the
claim on the merits and on whether the government action can be
classified as an expenditure. 68 To make matters worse, in Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation. of
Church & State, 69 the Court interpreted the Flast test in an almost
comically literalistic fashion, ruling that the donation of real property, even real property worth a half million dollars, is not an "expenditure'' which will support standing. 70
This judicial slalom is hardly one to make the United States
Supreme Court proud. Federal decisions exploring the contours of
the case or controversy requirement of Article III, however, are not
binding on the state courts. The states are free to fashion their own
concepts of justiciability. Given that, and given the federal courts'
poor record of performance in the area, any state determination to
blindly embrace the federal path is unwarranted. The Tug Valley
decision offers a preferable alternative for state judiciaries seeking

Id. at 104, 261 S.E.2d at 171.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
66 The same principles seem to apply, at the federal level, for any sort of taxpayer challenge except to one's own tax bill. See, United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
67 Flast, 392 U.S. at 102-05.
"" See, Justice Harlan's dissent in Flast, 392 U.S. at 116-33. See also Nichol, Injury and the
Disintegration of Article Ill, 14 CALIF. L. REv. 1915 (1987).
•• Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454
u.s. 464 (1982).
70
Id. at 489. See generally Nichol, Standing on the Constitution: The Supreme Court and Valley
Forge, 61 N.C.L. REv. 798 (1983).
64

6
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to open their doors under comprehensible guidelines of justiciability.

C.

Into the Breach

A final category of state constitutional decisions I want to emphasize is more easily characterized. There are, perhaps surprisingly,
substantial areas of constitutional conflict which have not been directly addressed by decisions of the United States Supreme Court. 71
Accordingly, state supreme courts and federal circuit courts have
greater liberty to fashion what they deem to be appropriate rules
of decision. Of course the easy, and perhaps traditional, response
by state tribunals to either ambiguity or a clean slate at the federal
level has been to deny the constitutional challenge. Unless clearly
forced, the theory seemingly goes, state courts will reject the claim
of constitutional right.
As the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and other energetic state judiciaries have shown, however, another response is
not only possible, but strongly suggested by our federal system. Like
the judges of the federal circuits, state supreme court justices can
contribute to the national dialogue through which constitutional jurisprudence is molded. As indicated, a state court's interpretation of
its constitution can, in the proper circumstance, delimit the law of
the jurisdiction free from federal oversight. With a well constructed
opinion, it is also possible for a state tribunal to reach beyond its
boundaries and affect the development of constitutional decisionmaking in other fora. Consider these illustrations.
In Webb v. Fury the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
became one of the first tribunals in the nation to offer greater protection for the right to petition the government than has been af-

One ready example is the panoply of issues naturally spawned by the United States Supreme
Court's privacy decision. For the most part, the Court has left the development of the doctrine to
state and inferior federal courts. See Carnohan v. United States, 616 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1980)(use
of laetrile); Alaska v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978) (use of cocaine); People v. Fries, 42 Ill.
2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149 (1969) (motorcycle helmet laws). But see Hardwick v. Bowers, 106 S. Ct.
2841 (1986).
71
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forded to communications under the free speech clause. 72 The Webb
decision arose from a libel suit filed by DLM Coal Co. against a
Braxton County environmentalist. DLM sought a huge damage award
in circuit court as "compensation" for statements made by Webb
to the Environmental Protection Agency and the Office of Surface
Mining concerning DLM's operations. Issuing a writ of prohibition,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals prevented the libel suit
from proceeding to trial. 73 In an opinion by Justice McGraw, the
court held that Webb's statements represented the exercise of "a
clear constitutional right and [do] not give rise to a cause of action
for damages. " 74 Borrowing from a line of federal antitrust decisions,
the justices held that statements directed to government officers are
protected by Article III, section 16 of the West Virginia Constitution
unless they are shown to be '"a mere sham to cover what is actually
nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly"' with the plaintiff's business relations. 75 Accordingly, even an allegation of actual
malice, sufficient to overcome free speech and press protections in
the libel context,76 would not sustain DLM's cause of action. 77
The Webb decision has not gone unnoticed by other courts struggling with the boundaries of the right to petition. The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals relied on Webb to fashion an aggressive
protection of petition rights in Myers v. Plan Takoma. Inc. 18 And

n Webb v. Fury, 167 W. Va. 434, 282 S.E.2d 28 (1981). In fairness, I should say that my
former colleagues Bob Bastress, Chuck DiSalvo and I represented Rick Webb. My impartality on this
case, therefore, may be subject to question.
" Id. at 441-43, 282 S.E.2d 39-44.
74 !d. at 451, 282 S.E.2d at 39.
" Id. at 443-48, 282 S.E.2d at 35 (quoting Eastern Railroad President's Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961)).
76
See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). DLM also sued Webb for statements,
allegedly defamatory, contained in a newsletter distributed by Mountain Streams Monitors. Webb,
167 W. Va. at 456, 282 S.E.2d at 42. The newsletter references, since they were not directed solely
to government officials, obviously fit less neatly under the petition umbrella. The court concluded,
however, that the statements in the newsletter "come within the immunity conferred" by the right
to petition. Id. at 456, 282 S.E.2d 42. The majority emphasized that the letter was an "exhortation
to the public" designed to influence "passage and enforcement of laws". Id. That, combined with
the apparent belief that suit libel suit was based on an "exchange of ideas which is more properly
within the political arena than in the courthouse led to the dismissal of all counts." Justice Neeley
dissented on the point. Id. at 461, 282 S.E.2d at 45.
77 Webb, 167 W. Va. 456-59, 282 S.E.2d at 42-43.
78 Myers v. Plan Takoma, Inc. 472 A.2d 44, 46-7 (D.C. 1983).
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the Maryland courts have adopted a near absolute petition right, 79
again based on Webb. The Eighth Circuit recently discussed the
Webb ruling extensively, and agreed with Justice Neely's dissenting
opinion that it "overstates the reach" of the petition right. 8°Finally,
two years ago in McDonald v. Smith, 81 the United States Supreme
Court concluded that, under the federal constitution, ''First Amendment rights are inseparable ... and there is no sound basis for granting greater constitutional protection to statements made in a
petition ... than other First Amendment protections." 82 The McDonald Court did not discuss Webb. The district and circuit court
decisions below, however, had weighed the pros and cons of the
Webb ruling in the balance. 83 It is my guess that the last word has
not yet been written on the scope of the petition right, and Webb
will play a major role in the doctrine's development. 84
An even more significant indication of the impact state constitutional decisionmaking can have on the federal adjudicative process
is demonstrated by West Virginia Citizens Action Group v. Daley. 85
Daley examined the constitutionality of a Fairmont ordinance which
prohibited charitable residential solicitation from sunset to 9 a.m. 86
The city argued that the provision served the dual goals of crime
prevention and privacy. The Daley opinion measured the relation-

See Sherrard v. Hull, 53 Md. App. 553, 456 A.2d 59 (1983); Bass v. Rohr, 57 Md. App.
609, 471 A.2d 752 (1984).
80 In re IBP Confidential Business Documents Litig., 755 F.2d 1300, 1311-12 (8th Cir. 1985).
•• McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
82 /d. at 485.
" See Smith v. McDonald, 562 F. Supp. 829, 842 (M.D.N.C. 1983); Smith v. McDonald 737
F.2d 427-28 n.3 (4th Cir. 1984).
.. McDonald only clearly rejected the notion of an absolute petition right, which Webb had
rejected as well. Although the Supreme Court saw "no sound basis" to distinguish between speech
and petition rights, there are distinctions to be drawn between the two activities. Petitioning communications, unlike statements in the press (the typical libel claim), are not immediately distributed
to the public at large. The nature of the harm inflicted, therefore, can not only be different in kind,
but the government official receiving the petition can act as a buffer to eliminate the further distribution of a libelous allegation. The difference may not be enough to warrant an absolute privilege.
But it may serve as the basis for a stronger protection than is offered under the speech and press
clauses.
"' West Virginia Citizens Action Group, Inc. v. Daley, 324 S.E.2d 713 (\V. Va. 1984).
86 The Daley court also found the "sun set" terminology employed in the statute to be impermissibly vague. /d. at 721. The court's discussion of the constitutionality of an ordinance which
prohibits evening (weekday) solicitation, therefore, is dicta.
79
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ship between these laudable aims, the Fairmont ordinance, and the
demands of free speech and association.
The United States Supreme Court has yet to outline directly the
method for determining the constitutionality of such a content-neutral, time, place, and manner solicitation regulation. Shortly before
Daley was decided, however, the Third Circuit had upheld a similar
statute in Pennsvlvania Alliance for Jobs & Energy v. Council of
Borough of Munhall. 87 While acknowledging the act's impact upon
protected expression, the Third Circuit reasoned that the solicitation
ban was closely tied to legitimate governmental interests and that
it left open ample alternative channels of communication. 88
In Daley, however, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
rejected the Third Circuit approach. Justice McGraw's opinion for
the court argued that by focusing only on the ordinance's goals and
the availability of other channels of expression, the methodology
employed in Pennsvlvania Alliance ignored the existence of alternatives which would accomplish much of the provision's agenda
without so significantly burdening speech. 89 Registration of canvassers, fraud and trespass prosecutions, and forced compliance with
"no solicitation" signs were cited as available means to accomplish
crime prevention and the protection of the home without inflicting
the dramatic impact on protected expression which flows from a
dusk to dawn proscription. Moreover, the court added that Article
III, section 3 of the West Virginia Constitution "offers limitations
on the power of the state to inquire into lawful associations and
speech more stringent than those imposed by the Constitution of
the United States. " 90 Accordingly, ordinances "which do not permit
some evening activity during the week impermissibly impinge
upon ... free speech rights." 91
The following year the Seventh Circuit was faced with yet another solicitation regulation case. Exploring the divergent views exPennsylvania Alliance for Jobs & Energy v. Council of Munhall, 743 F.2d 182 (3rd Cir. 1984).
/d. at 187-88.
89 Daley, 324 S.E.2d 722-25.
90 /d. at 725 (quoting Pushinsky v. Bd. of Law Examiners, 164 W. Va. 736, 745, 266 S.E.2d
444, 449 (1980)).
91 !d. at 726.
87

88
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pressed in Daley and Pennsylvania Alliance, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was
correct and invalidated the ordinance because it failed to employ
less restrictive alternatives. 92 In City of Watseka v. Illinois Public
Action Council, 93 decided in 1986, the Seventh Circuit reiterated its
commitment to tight first amendment scrutiny, again relying on
Daley. 94 Faced with this barrage, the Third Circuit apparently changed
its stance in New Jersey Citizens Action v. Edison Transp. 95 There,
citing Daley and the Seventh Circuit determinations, 96 the court invalidated a local ordinance because it provided for "no alternative
channels of communication that adequately serve their important
First Amendment rights." 97 Accordingly, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals effort at state constitutional interpretation in Daley
seems to have worked to alter the federal courts' vision of the First
Amendment.
III.

CoNCLUSION

This anecdotal portrait hardly says all that there is to say about
the work of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Constitutional interpretation is but a part of the court's duty, and state
constitutional interpretation makes up only a segment of even that
effort. Moreover, the court's aggressive use of judicial power 98 and
its "flexible" 99 attitude toward precedent should not be discounted
as causes for concern. My point is simply that the justices' "frequent
recurrence to fundamental principles" 100 represents a significant contribution to constitutional development both within and without the
state's borders. That is, of course, as it should be. It was aggressive
Wisconsin Action Coalition v. City of Kenosha, 767 F.2d 1248, 1254-58 (7th Cir. 1985).
City of Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547 (7th Cir. 1986).
94
Id. at 1553.
9' New Jersey Citizen Action v. Edison Township, 797 F.2d 1250 (3rd Cir. 1986).
96
Id. at 1255.
97
Id. at 1262.
93
See, e.g., State ex rei. Bd. ofEduc. v. Rockefeller, 167 W.Va. 72,281 S.E.2d 131 (1981)(granting
writ of mandamus overturning governor's reduction of expenditures for public education).
99 Compare, for example, the court's description of liberty interests in Major v. DeFrench, 286
S.E.2d 688 (W. Va. 1982) with that in Freeman v. Poling, 338 S.E.2d 415 (W. Va. 1985).
"" The language is George Mason's-set forth in Virginia's 1776 Declaration of Rights. See VA.
CONST. art. I, § 15.
92
93
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state court experimentation, it will be recalled, which resulted in the
practice of judicial review in the first place. 101 It is true that the
strains of politics and the pressures of the times have their effects
on this tribunal like any other. But as Walter Lippman claimed, the
boundaries of liberty are measured only by seeking them in the main
business of human life - not in the "creation of abstract theorists."102 And if the business of life is stirred by conflict and controversy, occasionally the judiciary's efforts to enliven the grand
guarantees of our fundamental charters will rankle as well. Constitutional decisionmaking, in this country, is a multi-faceted enterprise. It is heartening to note that sometimes significant players
live right in the neighborhood.

See Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (1 Call) 5, 8 (1782)("Nay more, if the whole legislature,
an event to be deprecated, should attempt to overleap the bounds, prescribed to them by the people,
I, in administering the public justice of the country, will meert (sic) the united powers, at my seat
in this tribunal; and, pointing to the constitution, will say, to them, here is the limit of your authority;
and hither shall you go, but no farther."-George Wythe).
102
\V. LIPPMAN, THE EssENTIAL LIPPMAN, 230 (1963).
101

